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Abstract 
In Peer-to-Peer (P2P) media distribution, users obtain content from other users who already have it. This 
form of decentralized product distribution demonstrates several unique features. Only a small fraction of 
users in the network are queried when a potential adopter seeks a file and many of these users may even 
free-ride i.e. not distribute the content to others. As a result, generated demand may not always be 
fulfilled immediately. We present mixing models for product diffusion in P2P networks that capture 
decentralized product distribution by current adopters, incomplete demand fulfillment and other unique 
aspects of P2P product diffusion. The models serve to demonstrate the important role that P2P search 
process and distribution referrals – payments made to users that distribute files – play in efficient P2P 
media distribution. We demonstrate the ability of our diffusion models to derive normative insights for 
P2P media distributors by studying the effectiveness of distribution referrals in speeding product diffusion 
and determining optimal referral policies for fully decentralized and hierarchical P2P networks.  
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1.  Introduction 
Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks are distributed networks in which the participants share their own resources 
in addition to consuming them from others. In P2P-based media distribution, users download content 
from other users who have the content and in turn redistribute it to future adopters. P2P allows a content 
provider to efficiently distribute content at a relatively low cost and is also effective in handling flash 
crowds in content distribution (Padmanabhan and Sripanidkulchai 2002). A number of encryption 
technologies have also emerged to prevent piracy in P2P networks. Thus, although the early use of the 
technology was for illegal file sharing, P2P is increasingly being adopted for legitimate media distribution 
on the Internet. P2P is being used for online radio (e.g. Social.fm), Internet TV (e.g. Joost) and software 
distribution (e.g. distribution of the RedHat Linux OS on BitTorrent). Recently, NBC Universal and AOL 
announced Internet TV initiatives based on P2P technologies. In addition, Altnet, iMesh, Grooveshark, 
rVibe, We7 and several other firms use a P2P distribution platform to sell music and other digital media 
licensed from the music labels. In 2004, there were over 50 million legal downloads per month on Kazaa 
for over 10,000 titles in Altnet’s library (Currah 2004). In 2007, over 9.5M music files were uploaded by 
10,000 beta users of Grooveshark’s P2P music download service.1  
Nodes in a P2P network are potential consumers of a digital product and, by virtue of the design of 
P2P networks, can redistribute the product upon buying it. P2P distribution is unique relative to 
centralized media distribution in that decentralized supply often imposes a constraint on demand 
fulfillment. In most P2P architectures, only a fraction of the nodes in the network are queried in response 
to a request in order to prevent flooding the network with queries. Thus, even if a file exists in a network, 
nodes containing the file may not always be queried. Further, even if a node containing the requested file 
is queried, the node may not distribute the file. Free riders – users that consume content from the network, 
without sharing or redistributing it to other users – are known to be pervasive in P2P networks (Adar and 
Huberman 2000). As a result of these two factors, generated demand may not always be satisfied. Thus, 
                                                 
1
 Source: personal conversations with Sam Tarantino, CEO of Grooveshark, January 2008 
 2 
“supply-side” factors related to incomplete search of the network and the redistribution incentives have a 
crucial impact on file diffusion within the network.  
Commonly used redistribution incentives include penalties to users who free-ride and rewards to 
users who contribute. Penalties include intentionally slowing the download of free-riders as in the 
BitTorrent protocol. Penalties are used sparingly in commercial P2P systems where users pay to obtain 
content. Commercial P2P networks often provide payments, known as distribution referrals, to users who 
distribute content to others in the network. Distribution referrals have been advocated in various studies 
(e.g., Golle et al 2001; Arora et al. 2003) and are used in several commercial P2P networks. For example, 
Altnet pays users on the Kazaa network who agree to join Altnet as distribution points (New York Times 
2003). Grooveshark and rVibe also compensate users for distributing content. In these networks, 
whenever a new user purchases a track, a small payment is made to the user that distributes the content to 
the buyer. rVibe currently pays the distributing user $0.05 on a $0.99 sale and Grooveshark pays the user 
$0.25 per sale (Techcrunch 2007). Hereafter, we refer to these payments as referrals.
2
 
In this paper, we propose a model for diffusion of digital products in P2P networks that explicitly 
captures the supply-side factors - file search and redistribution incentives - described above and 
demonstrate the applicability of our model by studying optimal payments to users who distribute content. 
Modeling product diffusion is of considerable interest to managers. Diffusion models can be used for 
demand forecasting and for planning a variety of pre-launch and post-launch strategic decisions such as 
optimal level of product sampling, optimal pricing and optimal timing of successive generations of a 
product (Mahajan et al. 2000). As a result, product diffusion models have been actively studied in 
marketing for over forty years. These models primarily focus on the demand generation process. They 
generally assume that the generated demand is always fulfilled and do not model the important supply-
side constraint in P2P networks. The few papers in the product diffusion literature that have modeled 
                                                 
2
  However, it is useful to distinguish the referrals in P2P from traditional referrals. Traditional referral fees are paid 
to existing customers for bringing new customers to the firm. In contrast, the referral in P2P encourages existing 
customers to distribute content, which increases the file availability and in turn sales. Thus, the primary impact is 
on the supply-side. 
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supply constraints have done so in centralized settings where supply does not depend on the number of 
current adopters or actions taken by them. In contrast, current adopters generate the supply in P2P 
diffusion. These supply-side factors, tied to the file search process and free-riding in the network, 
significantly influence product diffusion in P2P networks and are in fact of most interest to P2P network 
managers. It is thus important to incorporate these into diffusion models. 
Our study of product diffusion in P2P networks makes three main contributions. First, we develop a 
diffusion model that incorporates supply-side constraints unique to P2P networks and derive analytical 
results regarding the sales dynamics. Specifically, we develop a mixing model of file diffusion that 
incorporates both incomplete search and free-riding in P2P networks. Second, we present an application 
on optimal referrals that endogenizes the impact of distribution referrals on file availability and overall 
profits. We derive expressions for the optimal referral and show that a referral policy that accounts for 
diffusion dynamics is far more profitable than a myopic policy that ignores these dynamics. Finally, we 
demonstrate that the file search architecture exerts a strong influence on diffusion. We find that a 
hierarchical architecture with a few groups demonstrates faster diffusion than flat P2P networks. 
However, there are diminishing returns from increased centralization.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review related literature. In Section 3, 
starting with existing epidemiological models, we develop analytical models to capture the dynamics of 
diffusion in P2P networks. Section 3.1 introduces the notation. Section 3.2 develops diffusion models for 
flat P2P networks and includes a study of the optimal referral policy. Section 3.3 focuses on product 
diffusion and optimal referrals in hierarchical P2P networks and examines the impact of the search 
architecture on the rate of diffusion. Section 3.4 employs simulations to test the robustness of the models 
under more general demand processes. Section 4 concludes this study, and discusses future work. 
2. Literature Review 
There are three streams of work highly relevant to our study of P2P content diffusion. The first two relate 
to the literature on new product diffusion and epidemiological diffusion respectively. The third relates to 
studies of free riding in P2P networks and the use of referral payments to address the same.  
 4 
Product Diffusion: Direct work on P2P content diffusion is limited. A notable exception is the work 
by Izal et al. (2003) on an empirical study of file diffusion in the BitTorrent network. Developing an 
analytical model of file diffusion within networks is not the focal point of the paper. However, there is a 
vast body of work on new product diffusion models, dating back to 1960s. Fourt and Woodlock (1960) 
propose a product diffusion model in which a fixed fraction of the consumers who have not yet bought the 
product do so every period. Bass (1969) proposed an extension that additionally incorporates word of 
mouth (WOM) communication between current adopters and potential adopters. Building on this model, 
work has also been done to incorporate effects of advertising and promotion (Horsky and Simon 1983), 
competition (Krishnan et al. 2000) and pricing (Bass 1980).  
These diffusion models focus on demand generation and assume that demand is always fulfilled. In 
P2P networks, a potential adopter is only able to conduct an incomplete search of the network and even 
the queried nodes may free-ride. As a result, demand is often not fulfilled immediately. In this sense, the 
supply-constrained diffusion models of Ho et al. (2002), Kumar and Swaminathan (2003), and Jain et al. 
(1991) are more relevant to our diffusion model. These papers study situations where demand is not met 
due to production capacity constraints. However, they focus on centralized settings wherein the 
managerial intervention is tied to capacity sizing. In contrast, the distribution infrastructure in P2P 
networks is decentralized and the product supply involves a social process. The more the number of 
current adopters and higher their willingness to distribute a product, greater is the file availability in the 
network. Thus, product adoption directly increases product supply. Further, the relevant managerial 
interventions relate to the design of the search process and incentives to encourage nodes to distribute 
content rather than an increase in the centralized capacity. Our diffusion model uniquely captures these 
variables and the dependence between product diffusion and social supply. 
Epidemiological Diffusion: Infectious diseases spread from infected nodes to susceptible nodes and 
are examples of decentralized diffusion processes. Epidemic diffusion models have been used in 
computer networking research, including in studies of information diffusion in mobile ad hoc networks 
(Khelil and Becker 2002) and spread of computer viruses (Kephart and White 1991). The diffusion 
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mechanism in P2P networks is in many ways similar to the spread of diseases. Broadly speaking, when a 
node seeks content in a P2P network, a request is sent out to other nodes in the network. File transfer is 
completed once a node that shares the desired resource is found. Similarly, in the spread of diseases, an 
infected individual makes contact with people around her and disease transmission occurs once a 
susceptible individual is contacted. Thus, the susceptible in epidemic diffusion is analogous to the node 
seeking content in P2P and the infected is analogous to the node that distributes content.  
Despite these similarities, diffusion in a P2P network is unique in several ways. One major 
difference is that the susceptible agent typically receives a disease passively whereas the node seeking 
content initiates the contact in P2P diffusion. This implies that epidemic contact occurs in a semi-random 
manner, while the search process in P2P network is not. P2P search can be architected and the design 
choices have a notable impact on diffusion. For example, although the content in P2P networks is always 
distributed, the search process can be completely centralized, completely decentralized/flat or hierarchical 
(Asvanund et al 2004). Networks like Napster maintained a single central catalog and search requests 
were forwarded to the central server. Gnutella version 0.4 is completely decentralized with each node 
maintaining its own catalog and responding to search queries. Gnutella version 0.6 and Kazaa use a 
hierarchical architecture wherein nodes connect to supernodes which are in turn connected to each other. 
The supernodes index the content for their nodes and respond to search requests. An additional difference 
is that the reproductive capacity of a virus usually grows proportionately with the diffusion of a disease. 
In contrast, file availability and free-riding impose a constraint on product diffusion in P2P networks. 
Finally, epidemiologists are interested in slowing the diffusion through vaccinations or by quarantining 
the infected. P2P managers are interested in speeding the diffusion by appropriately architecting P2P 
search process or using referrals and other incentives to encourage users to distribute content.  
Free Riding in P2P and Payment-based Incentives: Free riding, which has been widely 
documented in P2P networks (Adar and Huberman 2000, Asvanund et al 2004), can slow the diffusion of 
products within the network. Several approaches have been proposed to alleviate this problem, for 
example, offering higher Quality of Service (QoS) to users that share their resources (Kamvar et al 2003). 
 6 
In commercial P2P networks, where users pay for content, content providers can use payments to 
encourage users to distribute content to others in the network (Arora et al. 2003, Lang and Vragov 2005). 
Golle et al (2001) discuss the use of micropayments to reward peers for distributing content. A number of 
commercial P2P systems such as Grooveshark and rVibe use payment-based incentives to encourage 
users to share and distribute content. 
3.  P2P Diffusion Model  
The diffusion models we develop are homogeneous mixing models. In homogeneous mixing models, 
there is no spatial structure, i.e. specific neighbors of a node are not modeled, and all nodes within a 
compartment (i.e. of the same type) run the same risk of being infected. One can employ the equivalent of 
mean field analysis for large populations ( N  ) to develop differential equations that capture the 
dynamics.
3
 Popular examples of homogeneous mixing models include the SIR/SIS models in 
epidemiology (Diekmann and Heesterbeek 2000), Bass model in marketing (Bass 1969) and the Lotka-
Volterra model in population ecology (Brauer and Castillo-Chavez 2000). The implication of the 
homogeneous mixing setup is that we do not model the specific topological connections in the P2P 
network. The diffusion dynamics depend only on the number of nodes seeking or distributing content 
rather than which particular nodes seek or distribute content. We model the search process in P2P 
networks within the framework of the homogeneous mixing model. Specifically, groups in hierarchical 
networks are modeled as additional compartments in the diffusion model.  
 We begin by introducing our notation in Section 3.1. In Sections 3.2 and 3.3, we focus on 
diffusion in completely decentralized (flat) networks and hierarchical networks respectively. 
3.1 Notation, Definitions and Assumptions 
Consider a digital product such as a music file being distributed in a P2P network. Nodes in the network 
are potential consumers of the product and can obtain it from nodes that already have the product. 
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  In mean field techniques, the distributions of quantities over their randomness are represented instead by their 
average values (Newman et al. 2000). By ignoring certain dependencies, a closed set of equations for the expected 
values of variables can be derived (Opper and Saad 2001). Mean field approximations are often very accurate in 
the limit for large population sizes (e.g., see Newman et al. 2000; Anderson and Britton 2000). We thank an 
anonymous referee for pointing us to this literature. 
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Whenever a node distributes a copy of the digital product to another node, it gets a referral payment from 
the firm. In the discussion below, we assume that the firm paying the referral fee is the copyright holder.
4
 
Let N denote the total number of nodes in the network. We assume that there is no intermediary, i.e. 
a node that buys and sells the product while not seeking it, and that a node is used by one individual only, 
so no node consumes a file more than once. Thus N is also the market potential, or the total number of 
nodes that may eventually buy the product. The nodes that have the product already are called satisfied 
nodes. The number of satisfied nodes in the network at time t is denoted by ( )Q t  and the fraction of 
nodes that are satisfied is q(t)  Q(t) N. The nodes that do not yet have the product are called seeking 
nodes. The number of seeking nodes at t is ( )N Q t  and the fraction of seeking nodes in the network is 
(1q(t)). denotes the rate at which seeking nodes attempt to seek the product. Seeking nodes can obtain 
the product from satisfied nodes. Note however that not all satisfied nodes distribute the product. Satisfied 
nodes that are willing to distribute the product are called seeds. The number of seeds and fraction of 
nodes that are seeds are denoted by S(t) and s(t)  S(t) N respectively. In the rest of the model 
development, we simplify notation by denoting the number of seeking nodes, satisfied nodes and seeds by 
(NQ), Q and S respectively (and the corresponding fractions by (1q), q and s). It is implied that these 
are dynamic variables. Note that a satisfied node does not have to be a seed, but a seed must be a satisfied 
node first. Thus, SQ.  
We assume that the network contains some altruistic nodes that are always willing to be seeds even if 
there is no compensation for doing so and that the remaining nodes are “strategic” i.e. they will not be a 
seed unless the distribution referral is greater than their cost of being a seed. The fraction of nodes that are 
altruistic is denoted by  and the number of altruistic seeds is Q . The assumption of altruistic nodes is 
without loss of generality as may be set equal to zero. However, some users are known to distribute 
content in P2P networks in which no distribution referral is offered. This willingness to share may be 
fueled by a sense of community, reciprocity or other such factors. Let c denote a node’s cost of 
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  In reality, the firm can be the copyright holder of the content, the online retailer (i.e., the P2P firm) or both. 
Cooperative promotions between retailers and labels (copyright holders) are quite common in the music industry. 
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distributing a file and r denote the referral payment made to the seed that distributes the file. A strategic 
satisfied node will be a seed if and only if c  r. Assuming that c is Uniformly distributed in [0, C] across 
the strategic nodes, the number of strategic satisfied nodes that act as seeds is (1 ) ( / )Q r C . Therefore,  
 
(1 ) , if ;
, otherwise.
r
Q r C
S C
Q
 
 
   
  


  (1) 
When r = 0, file distribution relies solely on the goodwill of the altruistic nodes. We also assume that the 
firm is unable to price discriminate, i.e., altruistic nodes also get the referral even though they would 
share regardless.  
Finally, we describe the search process in the network and associated notation. We consider both a 
completely decentralized as well as a hierarchical network in this paper. In a completely decentralized or 
flat network, whenever a seeking node seeks a file, i neighbors of the seeking node are randomly selected 
and queried. Each of the queried nodes again forwards the request to another i unique nodes. This process 
continues until the maximum number of hops, denoted by j, is reached. Thus, the request will be sent to a 
total of 2 ( 1) /( 1)j jk i i i i i i        nodes. The search fails if none of these k nodes are seeds.5 In 
Gnutella 0.4, a seeking node will query 7 of its neighbors. If these nodes do not have the file, they each 
contact 7 of their neighbors, and so on until the maximum hop count of 10 is reached (Ross and 
Rubenstein 2003). 
Now consider a 2 level hierarchical P2P network in which N nodes are organized into M groups. We 
assume that all the groups are homogenous, except that one of them labeled Group-I has the initial 
satisfied node. Since the assignment of nodes to groups in current P2P networks is independent of both 
the request rate of the nodes and the content supplied by them (Garces-Erice et al. 2003), the assumption 
of homogeneity across groups is reasonable. The number of nodes in any group is given by /n N M . 
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 We do not model the network topology. We only assume that a node’s neighbors are randomly assigned and 
uncorrelated with whether that neighbor is a seed. Thus, each of the k queried nodes is just as likely to be a seed as 
any other node in the network. This implicitly models the interaction as though the network is fully connected. The 
assumption is for analytical tractability but is not as restrictive as it might appear for two reasons. First, P2P 
networks are regularly rewired and the neighbors are constantly changing as a result. Second, P2P networks have a 
small diameter (Ianmitchi et al. 2004) so most nodes are reachable in a few hops.  
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The number of satisfied nodes and fraction of nodes that are satisfied in Group-I are denoted 
IQ  and Iq  
respectively. Similarly, Q and q denote the corresponding variables for the other groups. Each group in 
the network has a super-node that provides indexing services to all the nodes within its group as shown in 
Figure 1. Any request from a seeking node will be satisfied if there is a seed within the group. This is 
because the super-node indexes all nodes in the group and can forward the request to the seed directly. If 
there is no seed in the group, the super node forwards the request to (l1) randomly selected groups.6 
Thus, a total of l groups in the network are queried. The probability that a randomly queried satisfied node 
distributes the file is given by (1 ) /r C     . Thus, given nq  satisfied nodes in a group, the 
probability that there is no seed in the group is (1 )nqp   . Similarly, the probability that there is no 
seed in Group-I is (1 ) InqIp   . Table 1 summarizes the notation that will be used in the rest of this 
paper. 
 
Figure 1: Hierarchical P2P Network 
Table 1: Glossary of Terms 
t Time  
N Total number of nodes in the network (also the market potential) 
Q(t) Number of satisfied nodes at time t, Q(0) > 0; q  Q  N 
S(t) Number of seeds at time t, S(0) > 0; s  S  N 
 Fraction of nodes that are altruistic 
 Average rate at which a seeking node seeks content 
r Referral per download offered to a node that distributes content 
c The cost per unit time of being a seed. [0, ]c U C  
Notation for a Flat P2P Network 
i Number of requests generated by seeking nodes in a flat network 
j Maximum number of hops for requests in a flat network 
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 Again, we assume that neighbors of supernodes are assigned randomly, uncorrelated with the density of seeds in 
the groups. This models the interaction as though the supernodes are fully connected. 
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k  Maximum number of nodes queried. ( 1) /( 1) 
jk i i i    
Notation for a Hierarchical P2P Network 
M Total number of groups in a hierarchical network 
n Number of nodes in a single group ( /n N M ) 
l Number of groups queried in a hierarchical network 
QI, qI Number and fraction of satisfied nodes in Group-I 
Q, q Number and fraction of satisfied nodes in a group other than Group-I 
 Probability that a randomly queried satisfied node distributes the file 
(1 )nqp    Probability that there is no seed in a group other than Group-I 
(1 ) InqIp    Probability that there is no seed in Group-I 
 
3.2 Diffusion Model for Flat Networks 
We begin by considering a completely decentralized P2P network. Whenever a seeking node seeks 
content, requests are sent to other nodes and forwarded within the network. A maximum of k nodes are 
queried as described in Section 3.1. If a request reaches a seed, the file is transferred to the seeking node, 
which then becomes a satisfied node. Otherwise, the request fails and the status of the seeking node 
remains unchanged. The node can return in a later period to seek the content. Since   is the rate at which 
a seeking node seeks content, ( )N Q   is the total number of seeking nodes seeking content at an 
instant when there are Q satisfied nodes. If each of these nodes sends out k requests,   1 1 ( / ) kS N   is 
the fraction of the nodes that reach at least one seed.
7
 Thus, the mean field diffusion equation for Q, i.e. 
the average rate at which seeking nodes become satisfied nodes, is 
 ( ) 1 1
k
dQ S
N Q
dt N

  
        
, or  (1 ) 1 (1 )k
dq
q s
dt
    , (2)  
We can substitute the expression for S from (1). A referral equal to C ensures that every satisfied 
node is a seed. Thus a referral greater than C is unnecessary. Substituting (1) into (2) and assuming r C ,  
   (1 ) 1 1 kdq q q
dt
     . (3) 
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 Because neighbor assignment is uncorrelated with whether a node is a seed, the probability that a neighbor is a 
seed is just S/N. 
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where  = (1 ) /r C    . Solving the above differential equation with the initial condition of Q(0)  1 
(or, q(0)  q0  1 / N), we obtain the following solution (proof in online supplement) 
 
1
=1
1 1 1
ln( ) ln( 1) ln( ) =
1 ( 1)
k
j
j Ik
j j
x
x a x x x t C
a k a k a x


     
  
 , (4) 
where = (1 )(1 / )a r C  , =1x q , IC  is a constant of integration computed in the online 
supplement and 2 /i j kjx e
  is the jth root of 1kx  , not including x = 1. In the supplement, we show that 
(4) has no imaginary parts and that the solution is unique. We also show that sales ( /dq dt ) is unimodal.  
Proposition 1: The product penetration q(tc)  at a given time instant tc increases with k in a convex 
fashion early in the file’s diffusion (small q) and in a concave fashion late in the diffusion (large q). The 
time t(qc)  to achieve a given level of product penetration qc decreases with k in a convex fashion. 
The proof is in the Appendix. Figure 2 illustrates proposition 1 for sample parameter values (N = 
10,000, Q(0) = 1, C = 1,  = 0.1,  = 0.5, and r = 0.2). The time to achieve 50% network penetration 
decreases with k in a convex manner, and product penetration after 8 time units (q(8)) is S-shaped in k. 
Proposition 1 indicates that the marginal benefit of querying more nodes can be increasing early in the 
diffusion. But once there are sufficient satisfied nodes, querying more nodes no longer provides the 
significant returns that it did before. Considering the negative effects of request flooding, there should be 
a threshold beyond which any further increase in k is not desirable. One potential impact of request 
flooding is that nodes have to respond to many more requests which in turn may reduce their likelihood of 
serving as seeds. Our model does not explicitly incorporate these costs of request flooding. However, 
additional analysis reveals that if the number of seeds decreases with k in a concave manner, there may be 
a threshold value of k beyond which the gains identified in Proposition 1 are offset by the reduction in the 
seeds. The analysis is omitted from this paper but available upon request from the authors.  
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Figure 2: Impact of querying more nodes on diffusion speed 
Proposition 2: The product penetration q(tc) at a given time instant tc increases with the referral r. 
Simultaneously, the time t(qc) to achieve a given level of product penetration qc decreases with r in a 
convex fashion.  
The proof is in the Appendix. An increase in the referral increases the willingness of satisfied nodes 
to serve as seeds. This in turn increases file availability and helps speed product diffusion. There is a 
tradeoff between offering a high referral to speed diffusion and reducing the referral to increase margins. 
We evaluate this tradeoff in Section 3.2.1 to compute the optimal referral r
*
.  
Consider a special case in which k =1, i.e. only one node in the network is queried whenever a 
seeking node attempts to obtain the content. (3) can now be solved to obtain the following closed-form 
expressions: 
 
( )
1
( , )
1 ( 1) A r t
q t r
N e

 
,  (5) 
and 
1
( , ) ln ln( 1)
( ) 1
q
t q r N
A r q
 
   
 
, (6) 
where ( ) ( (1 ) / )A r r C     . (5) and (6) specify an S-shaped P2P diffusion curve. These equations 
can be used to derive the optimal referral that the firm should offer. We turn to that question now. 
 13 
3.2.1. Optimal Referral  
We demonstrate the applicability of the diffusion model by studying optimal referral strategies in P2P 
networks. Diffusion modeling can be particularly useful here relative to myopic policies that determine 
referrals based on the immediate impact on sales without accounting for the impact on future sales. 
Denote the length of the planning horizon by T. Assume the referral r is constant throughout the 
planning horizon, and the unit price of the product is constant and normalized to 1. The firm’s profit from 
each sale is (1 – r). Thus, the referral optimization problem is  
 
0
max (1 ) (1 ) ( )
T
r
dq
r dt r q T
dt
 
   
 
 . (7) 
In the equation above
8
, we do not discount future sales for analytical tractability. The referral 
optimization problem for arbitrary values of k is relatively easy to solve numerically but closed-form 
results are hard to come by. In the following analysis, we focus on the case in which k =1 due to the 
tractability it affords. Numerical analysis suggests that although the magnitude of the referrals changes 
with k, the results are qualitatively similar to the ones highlighted below.  
Substituting q(t) from (5) into (7) and computing the first order condition with respect to r gives: 
 
1
( 1)exp (1 ) (1 ) 1 1 0
r r
N T T
C C
    
    
           
    
.  (8) 
Solving (8) and imposing the bounds on r, the result follows (proof in the appendix):  
Proposition 3: The optimal referral for the flat P2P network with diffusion specified by (5) is 
 *
1 1
max 0,min ,1 1 exp 1
(1 ) 1
C
r C W T
T N C

 
 
      
                     
, (9) 
where W(x) is the Lambert W-function (solution of  ( )exp ( )W x W x x ).  
Using the properties of the Lambert W-function, the following properties of the optimal referral are 
derived in the appendix. 
                                                 
8
  Strictly speaking, the objective function is  (1 ) ( ) 1/r q T N  . Since N is large, we approximate this to (1 ) ( )r q T .  
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Proposition 4: The optimal referral is (a) non-increasing with the fraction of nodes in the network 
that are altruistic (), (b) non-decreasing with the P2P network’s size (N), and (c) non-decreasing with 
request rate  for th   and non-increasing with  for th   where 
     
1
1 11 12 ( 1) exp ( 1)
1
th
e
W N e W N e
T N C

 

           
  
.  (10) 
As expected, an increase in the number of altruistic nodes reduces the need for a high referral. 
Similarly, product penetration occurs at a slower rate in a large network (see (5)). As a result, a higher 
referral is needed to speed the diffusion in a large network. 
Figure 3 illustrates the impact of  for sample parameters (N = 10000, Q(0) = 1, C = 1,  = 0.1). 
When β is extremely small, i.e. request rate among seeking nodes is low, the best strategy for the firm is 
to offer no referral. This is because the bottleneck is not free riding but low rate of demand generation. 
Once β reaches a certain threshold value, the referral starts having an impact and thus increases. Finally, a 
very high request rate helps speed up diffusion considerably. This helps generate altruistic satisfied nodes 
at a faster rate, which in turn reduces the need for a very high referral. As a result, we observe the switch 
from a non-decreasing relationship to a non-increasing relationship between *r and . 
 
Figure 3: Optimal Referral Vs Request Rate 
Now consider a myopic referral policy that does not account for the impact of referrals on future 
sales. The myopic referral maximizes the instantaneous profit given by 
 
(1 )
( ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
dq r
t r r q q
dt C

  
 
      
 
. (11) 
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Setting / 0d dr  , the optimal myopic referral is 
 
* 1
2 2(1 )
M
C
r


 

. (12) 
Proposition 5: The myopic referral is non-increasing with the fraction of nodes that are altruistic () and 
independent of both the request arrival rate  and the network size N.  
The proof follows from (12) and imposing the bounds on the referral. Interestingly the myopic 
referral, unlike the optimal referral, is independent of both the request arrival rate  and the network size 
N. This is because the instantaneous profit depends on the instantaneous demand, the fraction that is 
fulfilled and the margin per sale. The referral only impacts the fraction of demand that is fulfilled and the 
margin per sale but not the instantaneous demand which is fixed for the purposes of computing the 
instantaneous sales. As a result, factors such as  and N that influence only the instantaneous demand but 
not demand fulfillment or margins are irrelevant to the computation of the myopic referral. In contrast, the 
optimal policy accounts for the fact that the referral impacts the demand generated in future periods and 
thus the optimal referral interacts with the demand terms. 
In Figure 4, we plot the percentage increase in profit achieved by the optimal referral relative to the 
myopic referral against the fraction of altruistic nodes in the network () and the request rate (). The 
remaining parameters are N = 10000, T = 20 and C = 1. When  is high or  is either too low or too high, 
the need to offer referrals diminishes (see Propositions 4 and 5). Hence it does not matter whether a 
myopic or optimal referral is offered. However for intermediate request rates and low levels of altruism, 
as observed in reality (Izal et al. 2004; Adar and Huberman 2000), the optimal referral significantly 
outperforms the myopic referral. 
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Figure 4: Profit Differential between Optimal and Myopic Referral 
3.3 Diffusion in Hierarchical P2P Networks 
A number of P2P networks are hierarchical, rather than completely decentralized, in order to reduce query 
flooding. Kazaa, a popular P2P network, has a two level structure where leaf nodes are organized into 
groups. A rough estimate from 2003 indicates that there were 10,000 groups in the Kazaa network with 
the super-node in each group handling 200 to 500 nodes (Ross and Rubenstein 2003). 
Consider a 2 level hierarchical P2P network with M groups. As described in Section 3.1, the super-
node of the seeking node’s group will query all nodes within the group and also forward the request to 
(l1) neighboring groups. Let us first consider diffusion in Group-I:  
     ( 1)1(1 ) 1 (1 ) 1 (1 ) In q l qlI I I I
dq
q p p q
dt
  
        . (13) 
In (13), (1 )Iq   is the generated demand and  11 lIp p   is the fraction of this demand that is fulfilled 
(pI and p represent the probability that there is no seed in Group-I and another group respectively).  
Now consider diffusion in the remaining (M 1) groups. The generated demand in any group is 
(1 )q  . The probability that there is a seed within a group is (1 p). When there is no seed within the 
group, two cases arise. The first case is one in which all (l1) requests are forwarded to groups other than 
Group-I. The probability of this case (i.e. of not querying Group-I) is 
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1
2 1
1 1 1
M M M l
l l M

     
    
     
. (14) 
The probability that one of these (l1) groups contains a seed is  11 lp  . The second case is one in 
which one of the (l1) requests goes to Group-I and the remaining (l2) requests are sent to other groups. 
The probability of querying Group-I is 1 ( ) /( 1) ( 1) /( 1)M l M l M      . The probability that one of 
the groups contains a seed is  21 lIp p  . Hence, the probability that generated demand is fulfilled is  
    1 2
1
(1 ) 1 1
1 1
l l
I
M l l
p p p p p
M M
        
  
.  (15) 
Substituting the expression for p and pI, we get the diffusion equation 
 ( 1)
1
(1 ) 1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
1 1
Inqn l q nq
dq M l l
q
dt M M
   
   
           
. (16) 
We can jointly solve (16) and (13) to obtain the diffusion trajectory in each of the groups. The 
diffusion curve for the network as a whole is then obtained by aggregating the diffusion curves across all 
groups.
9
 While (13) and (16) can be solved numerically, there is no closed-form solution to these 
differential equations. The numerical solutions are discussed below.  
Figure 5 plots the diffusion curves based on (13) and (16) for different values of M. The remaining 
parameters are N = 10000, C = 1,  = 0.1,  = 0.5, l = 2, and r = 0.2. When the number of groups M is 
large the P2P network is similar to the decentralized network of Section 3.2. As M decreases, the fraction 
of requests reaching a seed increases significantly relative to a completely flat network and product 
diffusion occurs faster. Figure 6 plots the time to achieve 50% network penetration for the same 
parameters as in Figure 5. Initially, as we move from a flat structure to hierarchical structure, a small 
decrease in M will result in a significant reduction in diffusion time. However, as M reaches a sufficiently 
small value, further centralization will not necessarily help speed up the diffusion noticeably. The 
bottleneck is no longer the incomplete search of the network; rather, the bottlenecks are the rate of 
                                                 
9
  Overall product penetration in the network is  ( 1) /IM q q M  .  For large M, this can be approximated to q. 
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demand generation and the willingness of satisfied nodes to distribute the file. Given that the primary 
motivation for reducing the number of groups is to speed diffusion, there is little reason to prefer a 
completely (or nearly) centralized P2P architecture given other drawbacks of centralized structure such as 
the increased load on super-nodes. For example, Figures 5 and 6 suggest that there is little to gain by 
reducing groups below 50 for the given network configuration. 
 
Figure 5: Diffusion process under varying levels 
of network centralization 
Figure 6: Impact of network centralization on 
time to achieve 50% network penetration 
 
To illustrate the joint impact of incomplete search and free-riding, Figure 7 plots the time to achieve 
50% network penetration against the number of groups in the network M and the distribution referral r. 
Other parameters are the same as in Figure 5. When both aspects of supply are active constraints, there is 
much to gain by increasing the referral and/or reducing the number of groups in the network. However if 
the referral is very high then almost all nodes distribute the file and the gains from reducing M are 
somewhat modest. Similarly, if the network is highly centralized, the referral may not be as crucial. This 
of course assumes that there are sufficient altruistic nodes in the network ( = 0.1 in Figure 7). If most 
nodes in the network are not altruistic, then a referral will still be needed even with considerable 
centralization of the network. In summary, there are a number of interesting design parameters (M, r, l) 
available to managers and network designers that can be carefully tuned based on the diffusion model. 
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Figure 7: Impact of Incomplete Search and Free-riding on diffusion speed 
3.3.1 Optimal Referral in Hierarchical Networks 
In this Section, we investigate the optimal referral in the hierarchical network. Due to the complexity of 
the diffusion equation for a hierarchical network, we cannot derive a closed-form analytic expression for 
the optimal referral. We evaluate it numerically using (7) as the objective function and (13) and (16) as 
the diffusion equations. Figure 8 plots the optimal referral *r against the number of groups in the network 
(M) and the number of requests forwarded (l). The other parameters are N = 10000, C = 1,  = 0.1,  = 
0.5. Increasing the number of requests helps reduce the magnitude of the referral. Further, increasing the 
degree of centralization of the P2P network (i.e. reducing M) reduces the need to offer high referrals 
(provided there are a reasonable number of altruistic nodes). At the same time, if there are very few 
altruistic nodes in the network then increasing the degree of centralization cannot entirely replace the 
need for referrals (Figure 9). 
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Figure 8: Impact of Search Process on Optimal 
Referral 
 
Figure 9: Impact of Altruism and Network 
Centralization on Optimal Referral 
 
3.4 Simulations 
Our diffusion models focus on supply-side factors and model a simple demand process based on mean 
field analysis. We now employ simulations to study the robustness of the models under more general 
demand processes. Specifically, the simulations incorporate heterogeneity by allowing  to vary across 
nodes. Further, given the mean request rate  for any node, the simulation models a Poisson request 
generation process for each node (recollect that the model assumed a deterministic process). Thus, the 
timing of requests varies across simulation runs. We then compare the average outcome over these runs 
with the predictions from the models.  
The input to a simulation is the parameter set { , , , , }N C r  . Further {k} or {l, M} are additionally 
specified based on the type of network. First, N nodes are generated. A fraction ( ) of nodes are 
randomly selected to be altruistic nodes. For the remaining nodes, the cost of being a seed (c) is drawn 
from a Uniform distribution in [0, C]. Before the diffusion begins, one of the nodes is randomly chosen as 
the initial satisfied node. To allow heterogeneity, the content seeking rate is uniformly distributed from 
0.5  to 1.5  across the nodes. Given the mean seeking rate of a node, the request process is modeled as 
a Poisson distribution. That is, the time between successive attempts by a specific seeking node to locate 
content is drawn from an exponential distribution. Hierarchical networks are simulated by randomly 
forming M groups before the diffusion begins. Each group has a randomly selected super-node. 
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The diffusion process is simulated through a series of discrete steps. In the first step, the time until 
the first request is drawn for each node from the respective exponential distributions. The node with the 
lowest value is chosen as the first seeking node. The node is assigned several random neighbors at the 
time it is ready to request content. Requests are then forwarded to k randomly selected neighbors. If k 
exceeds the number of neighbors then these neighbors forward the request to their randomly assigned 
neighbors until k unique nodes are queried. If none of the requests reach a seed, the status of the seeking 
node is unchanged and the time before the node’s next attempt to locate the content is drawn. If the 
queried node is a seed, the status of the querying node is changed to a satisfied node. This newly satisfied 
node will be a seed if it is altruistic or if its cost of distributing content is less than the referral. Next, the 
node with the lowest time to a request is selected. The process repeats until all nodes are satisfied or the 
time reaches an upper threshold. The simulation is repeated 100 times with the same parameters and the 
average value of q is recorded as the simulation result. The simulation for the hierarchical network is 
similar except that nodes are organized into groups and requests are always handled by super-nodes. 
The predicted diffusion curve and the curve observed in the simulations (averaged over 100 runs) for 
a flat P2P network are plotted in Figure 10. The parameter configuration is N = 10000, Q(0) = 1, C = 1, 
  = 0.1,   = 0.5, k = 8 and r = 0.2. The mean field model reasonably approximates the mean diffusion 
curve. Figure 11 indicates that the model fits the simulations for a hierarchical P2P network as well. The 
parameter settings are N = 10000, M = 100, C = 1,   = 0.1,   = 1, and r = 0.001.  
 
Figure 10: Simulation result for flat P2P with 
Multiple requests 
 
Figure 11: Simulation result for Hierarchical 
P2P Network 
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4. Conclusions and Future Directions 
With the increasing use of P2P networks for distribution of digital products, modeling P2P product 
diffusion is of considerable interest. However, P2P diffusion demonstrates several unique characteristics 
not captured by traditional models. For example, generated demand is often not fulfilled immediately 
because of the decentralized distribution in P2P coupled with the incomplete search and free-riding by 
nodes. P2P media distributors are often most interested in understanding and designing these P2P-specific 
attributes such as P2P search architecture or use of distribution referrals to encourage file sharing. We 
developed models to capture the influence of the decentralized supply on product diffusion in P2P 
networks and demonstrated its application in determining optimal distribution referrals. Simulations 
suggest that the models are robust to heterogeneity across nodes and stochasticity in the request process. 
There exist a number of interesting avenues for future work. On the modeling front, we develop a 
mixing model and do not model detailed spatial structure in a P2P network. An interesting direction to 
pursue is that of modeling network topology and the entry and exit of nodes in the network. The network 
models of Anderson (1998), Durett (1999), Eubank et al. (2004) and Ganesh et al. (2005) are highly 
applicable in this regard. Models that incorporate network structure can sometimes generate novel 
insights on the diffusion process (e.g. see Durett 1999). Given the spatial structure, it is interesting to ask 
what types of network topologies and search strategies are effective in locating seeds in the network. In 
this context, recent work on decentralized search in complex networks is relevant (Kleinberg 2006; 
Liben-Nowell et al. 2005). Vega-Redondo (2007) provides an excellent overview of the topic. 
We assumed a monopoly setup in which unfulfilled demand returns in a future period. In reality, 
unfulfilled demand may be permanently lost to a competitor especially in the presence of a centralized 
media distributor such as iTunes. In addition, we assumed that the referral does not impact the demand 
process itself whereas it can impact the timing of purchases when participants are forward-looking. 
Modeling the loss of sales to competitors and the impact of distribution referrals on the demand process 
are likely to be particularly relevant to practice. 
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An interesting direction for future study would be in applying the models to address managerial 
questions tied to P2P media distribution. For example, how do prior results on optimal dynamic pricing, 
promotion, timing of product release, etc change under decentralized product supply in P2P? How should 
a firm "seed” a new product i.e., use free samples to support the distribution of a product whose 
availability is limited early in its diffusion? Similarly, a more detailed investigation of dynamic referral 
policies can be particularly useful for P2P managers. We are currently investigating this issue in ongoing 
work (Hosanagar et al. 2008). It would also be interesting to incorporate congestion costs to determine the 
optimal number of nodes to query in a decentralized network. Finally, a highly valuable extension would 
be the estimation of diffusion parameters using data from real P2P networks. Although it is ideal to 
estimate diffusion parameters from the closed-form solutions of diffusion equations, it may be necessary 
in our case to estimate parameters using discrete-time difference equations due to the complexity of the 
P2P diffusion models. Mahajan et al. (2000) provide an excellent overview of Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation (MLE) and Nonlinear Least Squares (NLS) based estimation techniques for diffusion models.  
All of the above comments suggest that there are a number of open problems and further study on 
P2P product diffusion modeling can prove useful. Our research is only a first step in this direction. 
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Appendix A: Diffusion in Flat P2P Network 
Proposition 1: The product penetration q(tc)  at a given time instant tc increases with k in a convex 
fashion early in the file’s diffusion (small q) and in a concave fashion late in the diffusion (large q). The 
time t(qc)  to achieve a given level of product penetration qc decreases with k in a convex fashion. 
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Proof: Suppose we fix t  tc. Given the number of requests forwarded (k), let the value of q at this instant 
be denoted = ( )q q k . The diffusion equation can be rewritten as 
 
0
( )
(1 ) 1 (1 )
q k
ck
q
dx
t
x x



  
.Now 
suppose we instead had (k +1) requests forwarded, then 
 
0
( 1)
1(1 ) 1 (1 )
q k
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q
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x x
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. Therefore, 
   
0 0
( ) ( 1)
1
0
(1 ) 1 (1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )
q k q k
k k
q q
dx dx
x x x x 


 
      
. Rewriting it, 
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. (A1) 
Since the second term is greater than zero, we can conclude that ( 1) ( )q k q k  . Thus, an increase in the 
number of nodes queried serves to increase the product penetration.  
Now let us evaluate the nature of the increasing relationship. Just as with (A1), we can derive, 
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. (A2) 
Taking the difference between (A1) and (A2), we have 
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Therefore: 
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The relationship between q(k+1), q(k), and q(k1) depends on the function 
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(1 ) 1 (1 )
k k
q
dx
q
x x



  
, which is increasing in q. If ( )k q  is concave, then for inequality (A3) to 
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hold, we require that ( 1) ( 1) 2 ( ) 0q k q k q k     . That is, we require q(k) to be convex. The second 
derivative of ( )k q  is negative when q is small. Thus, q(k) is convex with k for small q. 
To prove that q(k) is concave for large q, we rewrite (A1) and (A2) as: 
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. 
Taking the difference between the above two expressions just as we did with (A1) and (A2) to get (A3), 
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. (A4) 
Similarly, 
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 is increasing in q. If 
1( )k q   is convex, we require 
( 1) ( 1) 2 ( ) 0q k q k q k      to make inequality (A4) hold. That is, we require q(k) to be concave. The 
second derivative of 
1( )k q   is positive for large q. It thus follows that q(k) is concave with k for large q. 
Now, let us evaluate the impact of k on the time to achieve a given level of product penetration. 
Suppose we fix q = qc. Denote the time taken to achieve this level of product penetration by ( )t k . Then, 
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The second difference is:  
 
   
0
2 1
1 1
( ) (1 ) 1 (1 )1
( 1) ( 1) 2 ( ) 0
(1 ) 1 (1 ) 1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
c
k kq
k k k
q
x x x dx
t k t k t k
x x x x
  
   

 
  
     
      
.  
Proposition 2: The product penetration q(tc) at a given time instant tc increases with the referral r. 
Simultaneously, the time t(qc) to achieve a given level of product penetration qc decreases with r in a 
convex fashion.  
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Proof:  Recollect that 
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respect to r, we have  
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Now, let us evaluate the impact of r on the time to achieve a given level of product penetration. 
Suppose we fix q = qc. Taking the derivative of t with respect to r, we get  
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Proposition 3: The optimal referral for the flat P2P network with diffusion specified by (5) is 
 *
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,  
where W(x) is the Lambert W-function (solution of  ( )exp ( )W x W x x ).  
Proof: Setting the first order condition specified in (8) equal to zero, we get 
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. Rearranging this condition, we have 
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. 
This equation is of the form  ( )exp ( )W x W x x , where  
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Given the Lambert W-function W(), the solution to (A5) is: 
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. 
The second derivative at r = r
*
 is 
22
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, 
since r
*
 < 1. Therefore, the function is locally concave and r
*
 is a local maximum. However, the objective 
function is convex for small r and concave for large r.  We can nonetheless show that the objective 
function is unimodal, hence, r = r
*
 is a global maximum. To see this, consider the first derivative with 
respect to r. The denominator is positive, so the sign is determined by the numerator: 
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Suppose that Z(0) > 0. This is the condition under which a non-zero optimal r exists. Then  
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which is negative if r < 1 and positive if r > 1. Therefore Z(r), starting from a positive value at r = 0, 
decreases with r, crosses 0 at r = r
*
 < 1, and eventually increases with r for r > 1. However, for r >1, 
Z(r)< 0.  So, Z(r)   0 if *r r , and Z(r) < 0 if r > r*.  This shows that the objective function is unimodal.  
Proposition 4: The optimal referral is (a) non-increasing with the fraction of nodes in the network that are 
altruistic (), (b) non-decreasing with the P2P network’s size (N), and (c) non-decreasing with request 
rate  for th   and non-increasing with  for th   where 
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Proof: From (8), we have  
  
1 1
(1 ) 1 = > 0
( 1)exp (1 ) /
r
T
C N T r C
 
  

 
   
. Thus, 
*(1 )(1 ) / >1T r C   . It then follows that *1 > 0r . We will use this result below. 
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Using (8) and the equation   ( ) = ( ) / 1 ( )W x W x W x x  , we can rewrite the above expression: 
* * * *
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(b): W is an increasing function of N. Because *r is increasing in W, it follows that *r increases with N. 
(c): We have 
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where 
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properties of the Lambert-W function:  
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, (A6) 
and (1 ) 1ww e w  . Using these properties, the derivative can be rewritten as follows: 
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Hence, the sign of the above expression is determined by the expression: 
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Using (A6), (A7) can be rewritten as  1 ln ( 1)w w N w   , which is positive for small w and negative 
for w > wth, where   1exp ( 1)
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. It follows that *r  increases when th   and 
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. 
Imposing [0, ]r C , it follows that r* is non-decreasing for th   and non-increasing for th  . 
